The problem of trust in public institutions and economic development in the regions of Russia

Abstract

One of the main contradictions in the development of modern Russia is the conflict between its socio-political and socio-economic components. On the one hand, there is almost absolute confidence in the institutions of personified authority, that is confirmed many times by sociological research and the actual election results. On the other hand, there is constant capital outflow, internal and external emigration, economic degradation and de-industrialization, due to both economic and political factors. These processes happen together with low interpersonal trust, the weakness of social network interactions, growing institutional trust and enormous spatial gaps in social and economic projections. Economic development in countries with a low level of interpersonal trust traditionally bases on the government participation in the country's economy. Is a topical question whether the Russian tendency towards state capitalism due to the mentality? Russia is a country of regions, that is why the most powerful and profound processes take place in the regions. By statistical analysis we investigated the relationship between socio-economic processes in the Russian regions, the confidence of population estimates of different aspects of their lives and socio-economic situation according to the materials of the 10-year sociological monitoring (2006-2016).

Keywords: Trust, Cultural, Economic, Social, Regional institutions.

KOD JEL: P250, Z130, O170.

Problem zaufania do instytucji publicznych i rozwój gospodarczy w regionach Rosji

Abstrakt

Jedną z głównych sprzeczności w rozwoju współczesnej Rosji jest konflikt między jego społeczno-politycznymi i społeczno-gospodarczymi komponentami. Z jednej strony, istnieje prawie absolutne zaufanie do instytucji spersonalizowanej władzy, które wielokrotnie zostało...
potwierdzone przez badania socjologiczne i aktualne wyniki wyborów. Z drugiej strony, obserwuje się stały odpływ kapitału, wewnętrzną i zewnętrzną emigrację, degradację ekonomiczną i deindustrializację, zarówno ze względu na czynniki ekonomiczne, jak i polityczne. Procesy te następują łącznie z niskim poziomem zaufania interpersonalnego, słabościami interakcji społecznościowych, rosnącym zaufaniem instytucjonalnościovym i ogromnymi lukami obserwowanymi w prognozach ekonomicznych i społecznych. Rozwój gospodarczy w krajach o niskim poziomie zaufania interpersonalnego tradycyjnie bazuje na udziale rządu w gospodarce. Aktualne jest pytanie, czy rosyjskie tendencje do kapitalizmu państwowego wynikają z mentalności? Rosja jest krajem regionów, dlatego najsilniejsze i najgłębsze procesy odbywają się w regionach. Poprzez analizę statystyczną zbadano zależności między procesami społeczno-gospodarczymi w regionach Rosji. Zaufanie w społeczeństwie zostało oszacowane w zależności od różnych aspektów życia i sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej na podstawie materiałów monitoringu socjologicznego w latach 2006-2016.

Słowa kluczowe: zaufanie, kulturowe, gospodarcze, społeczne, regionalne instytucje.

KOD JEL: P250, Z130, O170.

Introduction


A. Seligman considered trust as “a main component of all long-lasting social relations” (Seligman 1997, p. 13). Any social system, taken as integrity, is in need of system trust among its subjects: “in fact, even the societies themselves cannot exist without trust” and “if there were no trust, there couldn’t be any economic transactions” (Seligman 1997). In the 1980s there was a series of authoritative studies, devoted to the issues of distrust and their refraction in social practice. Attention was drawn as well to the decrease in the level of social trust in many countries. As the reasons for this phenomenon there were mentioned such system processes, caused by modernization and globalization, as social isolation and anomie,
significant changes in demographics, politics, economics, culture, and institutional structures (Kaźmierczyk 2014; Kaźmierczyk 2015). J. Alexander studied trust as a fact of social exchange, social structure (Alexander, Marx, Williams 2004).

The hypothesis of the study is that level of trust in the public institutions by the citizens of Tyumen region is positively correlated with the indicators of well-being. It is assumed that trust relations in modern Russia are mostly rational. If the latter is true, the growth of trust must be accompanied by the growth of: social well-being, social optimism assessment and the approval of authorities actions. The reciprocity of trust relationships is also assumed, that means the reciprocity of trust options and the permissibility of deception, protest potential and protest willingness. It is assumed that the level of social trust rationality correlates with the degree of the society’s modernization. Therefore, the rationality of trust between citizens and state institutions can be an indicator of such modernization.

The key point of trust analysis became its reverse sides: distrust, risk, and actions like “at your own risk” related to it, the deception and the deceived expectations. F. Hirsch related the phenomenon of trust directly with the contemporary society’s characteristic growth of difficulties, risks and uncertainty in the future (Hirsch 1978; Hirsch 2005). N. Luhmann put a theoretical question about how certain structures of the social system could provide a reduction of complexity in order to provide more or less “reliable” control. Basing on the fact that any social system – no matter “bad” or “good” – anyway become more complex “themselves”, that confuses many people, N. Luhmann tried to solve the problem of trust complexity from the point of view of the social systems theory. N. Luhmann turned his attention to the dialectics of trust/distrust as a strategic basis for the choice/ action. Interpreting N. Luhmann’s approach to understanding the dialectics of trust and distrust in social systems theory – i.e. “trust as expectation” and “distrust as deceived expectation”, there is need to emphasize that trust and distrust here are “equalized” as “survival resources”, that in turn is determined by initial moral asymmetry of these positions. Developing, they become a reason of “complexity reduction”, that at last provides an opportunity to understand how “the system can respond to that little that it permits” (Hirsch 1978, p. 125; Luhmann 1980).

Disintegration forms of modern societies and their perception assess today are more often given in the analytical context of the study of systematic and reflexive (internal and external) signs of distrust. One of the marks of the latest theoretical and empirical research on the sociology of trust is the focus of analysts on the “structural ambivalence” of mistrust (Luhmann 1980).
The purpose of this article is to check what modern theory of trust analysis takes pace in Russia. The main hypothesis is that the current stage of Russia’s development is characterized by a basic contradiction when the negative economic performance does not reflect in the level of trust in the institutions of authority. The mentioned conflict is not uniquely Russian, it in many ways reflects the problems of the world, but it takes the most vivid forms in Russia.

The article studies the structure and dynamics of public trust in the institutions of authority. We support the idea that people and cultures differ on the basis of trust. As trust relations in modern Russia are mostly rational, then the rule of law, improving the legislation and the spread of education is able to increase the degree of mutual trust. Rational bases of social trust link together the tense feeling in social space, justice/injustice of income distribution and the level of laws’ implementation, confidence in the people’s ability to protect their rights, assessment of the government institutions ability to perform their functions for the benefit of society.

**The conceptual basis of the trust analysis**

Nowadays, there are two opposite concepts of trust. The first one is focused on trust, from the point of view of individual prospects, on a purely personal characteristics and personality traits; the other one is based on trust, as “public domain” (Endress 2002, p. 94; Endress 2005). Different understanding of this problem leads to various practical assessments and consequences. Some scientists (group of optimists) believe that law supremacy, legislation improving and the spread of education are able to increase the degree of mutual confidence (Delhey, Newton 2003, pp. 95-107). Others (group of pessimists) do not see much impact of social trust policy and believe any socio-political action futile. From their point of view, there is an inverse dependence: a high degree of social trust in a given country entails a reduction in levels of crime, and respectively, the spread of quality education and improving legislation and vice versa. Both groups of analysts are unanimous that the most important determinant of the social trust level is public fractionalization, i.e. the division of society into groups according to the level of income inequality and their social status (Knack, Zak 2003).

Trust as a sociological concept is discussed in case it is considered in account of social norms and expectations that are entrenched in this social community. As R. Wuthnow says, trust will then “be understood sociologically” when it is “embedded into social institutions, social stratification, and social changes” (Wuthnow 2002). Transforming his ideas into the theory of trust, R. Wuthnow concludes: “Thus, a starting point for further study of trust and
turning it into a main stream of sociological theory is the need for an adequate understanding of the social structure in which primary social norms and expectations are embedded” (Bjernskov 2008).

E. Uslaner emphasizes the individual or the moral impulse of trust in his, and the trust comes from one source theory (Wuthnow 2004; Uslaner 2002; Rothstein, Uslaner 2005). That is “faith in people”, indicated in the title of his book “The Moral Foundation of Trust” (Wuthnow 2004). Only “faith in people” might explain generalized trust, such as trust to a stranger, about whom we know nothing by definition. “We cannot justify the credibility towards a stranger basing on their reliability, because we have no knowledge if they are honest or not. Instead, we have to assume that they are characterized by dignity and honor” (Wuthnow 2004, p. 15). Trust as “reputation” is a self-reproducing characteristic of the “moral community” that serves as a guarantee of trustworthiness of potential partners and predictability of their future behaviour. “Trust is the moral imperative of good relation to others, even in the absence of reciprocity” (Wuthnow 2004, p. 24). It sounds nice, but not quite realistic. E. Uslaner speaks of moral or strategic trust in situations of interpersonal interaction. In this case, social trust is also understood as reputation, but in moral or socio-psychological sense of the word. Operationalizing the concept of “social trust” on the empirical level, some researchers consider it as people’s tendency to trust each other within their country, i.e. “to be sure that fellow citizens, who you don’t have any information of, won’t deceive you” (Knack, Zak 2003, p. 271; Zak, Knack 2001, p. 296). Experimental studies of trust have shown that there are effects of social distance, which reflect the behavior in the different games of trust (Uslaner 2002, pp. 485-504).

“How do certain peoples and cultures differ on the basis of trust, especially in the time of increasing contacts between peoples and cultures?” F. Trompenaars tried to answer this question, comparing “universalist” people’s values with “particularistic” people’s values. Peoples of universalist culture say: “we should not trust those people [who are devoted to particularistic cultures], because they protect their friends with lies” (Trompenaars 2003). And on the other hand, peoples of particularistic culture say: “we should not trust people of universalist culture, because they will never protect his friends, even by means of lies” (Buchan, Croson 2004). Cross-national comparative study of generalized trust between Japan and the United States identified cultural differences in trust between the two countries (Trompenaars 2003; Yamagishi 1994). In particular, they found a significant and positive relationship between individualism/ collectivism and generalized social trust. For example,
the so-called “individualistic theories” (personality, success, well-being) “do” relatively well in societies with a high level of confidence; while the “collectivist theory” (social conflicts, political freedom, public safety) describe relatively well societies with a low level of confidence.” In Russia, low level of interpersonal trust is combined with high level of vertical trust, and our research demonstrates the growth of this contradiction (Yamagishi, Cook, Watabe 1998).

In literature, there has been much debate devoted to the problem of “generalized trust” which in general terms can be defined as a tendency to believe even a stranger. Every individual has original disposition to this kind of trust – at the individual, social, cultural, institutional or any other level. Therefore, speaking about generalized trust, we mean synthesis of the interaction of three characteristics (dimensions) of trust – cognitive, emotional and behavioral, each of which being an integral component of a common definition of trust (Sasaky, Davydenko, Romashkina, Voronjov 2013; Davydenko, Romashkina 2013).

Trust, viewed in the context of social capital, is the study of people’s predisposition towards cooperative behavior, which often determines what economic models can entrench in a particular community. This is what F. Fukuyama wrote about in his book “Trust”, where he mentioned the inherent to every culture natural inclination of different degree of social interaction (Bussey 2010). For example, along with Fukuyama, we can definitely state that the level of trust in society is directly proportional to the degree of economic development (the better economic development, the higher the systematic and interpersonal trust) (Fukuyama 1995, pp. 18-19). According to the results of S. Knack and his colleagues’ research in 41 countries there is a correlation of trust level and the level of per capita GDP, as well as level of investment activity and a number of other economic indicators (Knack, Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1995, p. 19). But, their critics were right, pointing out, that within the relationship of trust and economic development it is difficult to distinguish cause from effect, thus the correlation is mutual.

Trust is also correlated with the level of constitutional state development. And in this sphere the inverse connection is so strong that sometimes it’s difficult to define which relationships are legal, i.e. they imply the state possibility to punish the offender, and which relationships are based only on a particular type of trust (systemic, social, interpersonal). In some modern works, there have been pointed out the fundamental differences between so-called traditional (or, in other terms, archaic) societies and modern ones (or capitalist), especially when we speak about the basis of “trust – distrust” to the institutions of authority.
Traditionalism also includes belief in the sacral nature of authority that does not involve the verification of its legitimacy, i.e. we trust the government not because it is “bad” or “good”, but because it is “given us from on high”. And furthermore, on the other side of this approach, we can place the rational grounds of trust: we trust the institutions of authority because they justify our expectations, because we “live well”, and because they don’t deceive us, and so forth.

Nobel laureates in economics and prominent economists considered the influence of trust relationships, the potential of reciprocity in the economics as extremely important factors for the development of peoples and nations (Walker, Ostrom 2009; Richins, Rudmin 1994; Corneo, Jeanne 1997; Tilly 2007). The norm of reciprocity is of great importance in social trust. According to A. Gouldner in many cultures there is “a strong norm that says that if you do something for a person, that person has to do something of approximately equal social value for you in return. This is the norm of reciprocity” (Gouldner 1960). R. Putnam, M. Hollis, E. Nissenbaum tried to verify the hypothesis that “the norm of reciprocity is universal” (Putnam 1993; Hollis 1998; Nissenbaum 2001). The idea of reciprocity – born in Simmel’s writings on the norm of reciprocity in the practice of social sharing: that we need to “give and take” in roughly equal proportions – had as its consequence the importance for social balance theory. Gouldner developed the hypothesis about “the norm of reciprocity, in its universal form” in the following way: there should be performed minimum two related requirements: (1) people should help those who helped them; (2) people should not harm those who helped them” (Zak, Knack 2001). However, in “sacred” trust societies the norm of reciprocity may not work, that is demonstrated by today's Russia and many post-Soviet countries. On the basis of the analyzed literature, we highlight two specific aspects of trust to explain the connection between the level of trust in society and economic development. There will be considered the problem of institutional trust, interpersonal trust, social expectations of protests, the components of social well-being in the context of social trust.

The database description

The empirical data were collected and analyzed in the framework of the national research project “Social and cultural portraits of Russian regions” (Sociocultural dynamics… 2015). With the specified instrumentation the authors of this article with the support from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund conducted 5 waves of monitoring on the territory of Tyumen region. The samples represented Tyumen region’s population over 18 years taking
into consideration their age and sex, educational level, and the context of residence area and type of settlement. This article used the results of surveys of 1715, 1560, 2335, 1271 and 1514 Tyumen region (without the autonomous districts) citizens in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2016 accordingly. The sample percentage of 2016 was the following: 34.7% of rural and 65.3% of the urban population; 46% men and 54% women. These data were also published in monographs and articles (Davydenko, Romashkina 2013; Sasaky, Davydenko, Romashkina, Voronov 2013).

These there are involved the data from the national survey on the program "Socio-cultural portraits of Russian regions", where the samples represent the population of Russia over 18 years old. In 2015, the sample consisted of 1031 people, the survey was conducted by the Research Center of Socio-cultural Changes of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, under supervision by N.I. Lapin, L.A. Belyaeva, the description of the tools and methodologies of the surveys can be found at http://iphras.ru/soc_cult_changes.htm (01.10.2016).

The hypotheses

As the first hypothesis, we assume that in Russian society rational basis of trust keeps dominating. In this case, we should expect a strong link between institutional trust and social components of well-being. The latter, in its turn, is stratified on the assessment of their financial situation and the nearest future on the one hand, and on the other hand the assessment of life in general and far life perspectives. Then the first component reflects the current position and the second one shows general assessment. These two components correlate with the trust in a different way. Following J. Habermas, we assume that in the Russian society there grows traditionalist foundation of trust. The second hypothesis states that the norms of reciprocity in trust relations are valid only in modernized societies, and this reciprocity enhances rational basis of trust. If we believe in the sacred nature of authority, we do not expect reciprocity in relationships of trust, and trust will be more strongly connected with the level of security and is not associated with the assessment of material well-being and socio-economic dynamics.

Methods and indexes

Institutional trust is analyzed through the index, the average of the components from the list of institutions on the basis of the survey. Respondents are asked to rate on a 5-point scale
their level of trust, "Tell us, please, to what extent do you trust or do not trust the representatives of regional control systems?" (Trust completely, probably trust, it is difficult to say for sure, probably do not trust, do not trust completely). There was given the following list: the court, the governor, trade unions, the Prosecutor's office, the police, the regional government, political parties, the Regional Parliament, the mass media (press, radio, television), municipal local government, your employer, entrepreneurs, business community, Internet media. For nationwide studies there is provided the list of Federal and regional authorities. For each institute, the assessment was given on a 5-point ordinal scale, then we calculated a weighted average for transfer to a scale of 0 (nobody absolutely trusts) to 100 (everybody fully trusts all the listed institutions). The next step was to calculate the index of institutional trust on the average from 10 government institutions (Figure 1).

Interpersonal trust is demonstrated in accordance with the results of the answers to the question "Tell us, please, do you believe that most people can be trusted or do you tend to consider that even excessive caution in dealing with people will not be harmful?". Responses mean 11-point scale from "excessive caution will not be harmful" (0) to "most people can be trusted" (10).

For the analysis of protest potential the following indicators were used: 1) the level of protests’ expectation (What is the possibility of population’s mass protests in your city, town, village right now?) – with some degree of conventionality we can say that this is an indirect expression of protest; 2) the potential willingness to protest openly (Are you ready to participate in protests (against the decrease of living standards, violation of the citizens’ rights and freedom)? (ready, perhaps ready, perhaps not ready, absolutely not ready) – the current expression of protest intention; 3) chosen ways to protect their rights and interests (Which way are you ready to express your position against painful problems?) – the readiness to act.

The index of social well-being is calculated as an average of security, of satisfaction with life in general, and of social optimism (Regions in Russia… 2009, pp. 57-63). The degree of satisfaction with their life in general is the sum of such responses as "completely satisfied" and "rather satisfied" to the question "How satisfied are you with your life in general?" (1) in the Figure 7. The level of protection from problems and dangers is evaluated by the answers to the question: "Do you personally feel protected from the various dangers nowadays?", which contains the list of 10 dangerous problems (the sum of such answers as "rather protected", "fully protected"). The list of problems and dangers includes: crime, poverty, environmental threat, the arbitrariness of officials, the arbitrariness of law enforcement
bodies, loneliness and abandonment, persecution for political beliefs, harassment because of age or sex, oppression because of religious beliefs, denial of nationality. The index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the weighted average of positive responses to 10 components – (2) in the Figure 7. Social optimism is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the weighted average of the scores for each of the components: "Are you confident or not in your future today?" – confidence in the future (strategic optimism); positive answers to the question "Do you think you and your family will live better or worse the next year than today?" (tactical optimism); positive answers to the question "Do you and your family live better or worse this year than the previous one?" – (3), (4), (5) in the Figure 7, respectively.

The assessment of the reciprocal relationships of trust and deception is carried out on the answers to the questions: "Can employees deceive their employers?", "Can you deceive the representatives of the state government?" (the permissibility of deception). There is the review of the reciprocal relationship between assessments of deception permissibility, the level of trust in these institutions and the assessment of the possibility of deception on the part of representatives of those institutions. The assessment was given on a 5-point ordinal scale from "Yes, you can" to "No, you can't".

**Economic dynamics and trust: the problem of inconsistency**

In the period from 2000 to 2008, Russia was evolving in the context of unprecedented growth in hydrocarbon prices, which led to the growth of gross national product, and real monetary incomes of the population (Figure 1). However, these favourable conditions were not properly used. Production re-equipment and main funds’ modernization weren’t carried out. Moreover, the structure of the country’s economics was dramatically simplified (to the growth of mining and industrial production of the first level), the production chains of added value decreased. After the crisis of 2009 real production income and all other economic indicators fell for the first time. In 2010, the growth has already recovered, but not for a long time. After 2012 almost all economic indicators decrease, and indicators of investment activity and industrial production demonstrate this decline to a greater extent. If we agree with F. Fukuyama, then we would have to say that the level (the dynamics) of trust in society is directly proportional to the level (the dynamics) of its economic development. However, after 2006, Russia had a period of abnormal development. During this period, the economics was in a prolonged recession, and real incomes of the population had been falling for 3 years after 2012, investments in fixed capital never regained their growth, Figure 1. Russian regions (the
Tyumen one, in particular), demonstrate greater volatility, but the dynamics character in
genral cannot differ from the national average.

Figure 1. The dynamics of real monetary income of the population, indices of industrial production and
investments in fixed capital (in comparison with the previous year)

Source: compiled by the authors according to http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/region_stat/sep_region.html,
(access: 04.10.2016).

So, how does the population assess its social well-being, trust in institutions and each
other, and how is this related to the economic indicators? Since 2006, monitoring study of
Tyumen region inhabitants’ social attitudes uses a single measure of population’s institutional
trust. Respondents are asked to rate according to a 5-point scale their level of trust in regional
authorities and private social institutions.

As we know, the phenomenon of trust in Russia is mainly studied in its vertical dimension
as trust in institutions of authority. The latter implies authority delegation, the course
approval, loyalty, hope for positive changes, being ready to wait for these changes. During all
years of the surveys the population of the Tyumen region, one of the most economically
prosperous Russian regions, depicted rather critical attitude to the authorities. There is no
institution, the credibility of which would exceed the value of 50% (Figure 2; Regions in
Russia… 2009, pp. 274-284).
In 2016 trust rating was the following: the Court (48%), the Governor (44%), Employers (42%), the Prosecutor’s office (40%), the regional Government (38%), the Police (36%), the Regional Parliament and Local Government (31%), Trade Unions (29%), the Mass Media (28%), Regional offices of political parties (23%), Business community (22%), Internet media (22%) (Figure 2). However, in 2016, for the first time during all years of the observation, the region residents expressed more trust than distrust. The distrust level dominates over the trust one only in relation to the political parties (-7%), the mass media (-7%), the Internet media (-9%). Our data confirm that this region’s people’s trust in basic social and political institutions increased significantly.

In 2016 for the first time such subjects of public relations as “employer” and “business-community entrepreneurs” were included into the toolkit of trust-distrust estimation. Despite the fact that in a crisis situation labour relations become tough (because of the reduction threat, forcing to unpaid leaves, salary reduction), the level of citizens' trust in their employer was one of the highest (trusted completely by 11% of respondents and probably trusted by 42%). However, the entrepreneurs and the business community are trusted by only a small amount of respondents (trust completely – 5%, probably trust – 21%), and a quarter of
respondents – 25% “don’t trust”. Such ambivalence of trust relationship is not accidental, and it reflects several important for Russian citizens features. First, in Russia the trust to the personified objects is always higher than the one to the institutions as they are. Secondly, the official discourse of the negative business community perception, that is distributed practically in an official way, finds a large response in the mass consciousness. Thirdly, traditionalization, currently happening, leads to the fact that the institutions which directly affect the citizens’ welfare (in the political sphere (the President, the Governor, the Government), protection (the Court, the Prosecutor's office), and in the workplace (employers)) are endued by the sacral nature of authority. Even the police, the credibility of which is very low in Russia, have significantly improved its trust rating in 2016.

The reflection of the regional specifics in this pattern becomes evident from the national monitoring materials, conducted by the Center for the Study of Social and Cultural Changes at the Institute of Philosophy of Russian Academy of Sciences (Table 1) http://iphrs.ru/soc_cult_changes.htm (10.10.2016).

Table 1. The level of trust/distrust to the institutions of Federal and Regional authorities, Russia, 2015, % of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Don’t trust</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Court</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Russian President</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prosecutor's office</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Parliament</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mass Media</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Trade Unions</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Governor</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Court</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Prosecutor's Office</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Police</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Government</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional political parties offices</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Assembly of the Regional Government</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regional Media</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Local Government</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Notice: In general in Russia, in 2015 1031 people were surveyed.


First, the trust in the federal government is higher than the one in the local and regional authorities. The only exception is the Prosecutor's office and the mass media. Secondly, the trust in regional institutions in the region under investigation is only slightly different from the national data. Thirdly, there is no statistically stable relationship between interpersonal
trust (the answers to the question “Do you believe that most people can be trusted?”) and institutional trust neither on the level of the region nor in Russia in general. Fourthly, the protest potential within the whole Russia (the answers to the question “Are you ready to participate in protests?” were “Ready” and “Perhaps ready”) made up 30% in 2015, which is significantly less that the same level in the Tyumen region.

Reciprocity relations of legitimization of authority and self-estimation of an individual’s well-being is very high. The higher the self-estimation on the scale of financial position, the greater trust in almost all social institutions is expressed by respondents. The only exceptions are the media and trade unions, the level of trust to them is the same in all social strata.

We consider it important to note that estimates of trust in the institutions of authority are not perfectly rational. We’ll have a look at the answers to the question “Are you ready to protest against the decrease of living standards, violation of the citizens’ rights and freedom?” (there were 3 questions on various aspects, a 5-point scale for each question from “absolutely not ready” to “definitely ready”), reduced to the protest readiness index (protest potential) weighted according to the average evaluation index when 0 corresponds to “absolutely not ready”, and 100 means the global readiness to protest. We have calculated the index of institutional trust as an average from 10 institutional authorities (Figure 1), each of them was given a mark according to a 5-point scale, and further, we have calculated a weighted average to transfer the assessment into a scale of 0 (don’t trust at all) to 100 (everyone trusts all the listed institutions).

To analyze protest activity we used the following indicators in our research: 1) the level of expectation of protests (What is the possibility of population’s mass protests in your city, town, village right now?) – conventionality we can suppose that is an indirect expression of protests; 2) the potential readiness for open protest (Are you ready to participate in protests (against the decrease of living standards, violation of the citizens’ rights and freedom)? – that is the actual expression of disagreement; 3) selected methods to protect their rights and interests (What way are you ready to express the opinion on a sore problem?) – that is the readiness to act.
Figure 3 “What is the possibility of population’s mass protests in your city, town, village right now?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Area</th>
<th>Very Possible</th>
<th>Possible under certain conditions</th>
<th>Absolutely not possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big City</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle City</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small City</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice: The sum of answers “Very possible” + “Possible under certain conditions” depending on the type of living area, %

Source: compiled from the copyright surveys.

The highest level of expectation of protests was expressed by the citizens of medium-sized (with the population of 100-500 thousand people) and big cities (with the population over 500 thousand people) (Figure 3). The residents of big and medium-sized cities feel the “unfairness” of such social differentiation deeper than the residents of villages and small towns, because as they face it in their daily lives more often. However, the high level of protest’s expectation is not supported by the same high level of personal readiness to protest. Residents from different types of living areas declare almost the same level of readiness to take part in protests personally (Figure 4).

Figure 4 The distribution of the answers to the question “Are you ready to participate in protests (against the decrease of living standards, violation of the citizens' rights and freedom)?” depending on the type of living area, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Area</th>
<th>Ready</th>
<th>Not ready</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big City</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle City</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small City</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice: Data recalculated in the following way: “Ready” is the sum of the answers “Definitely ready” and “Perhaps ready”; and “Not ready” is the sum of the answers “Absolutely not ready” and “Perhaps not ready”.

Source: compiled from the copyright surveys.
The reciprocity of trust between government and population

The verification of the first hypothesis is the assertion that the growth of trust has to be accompanied by the growth of social well-being, the assessment of social optimism and the approval of the authorities’ actions. The verification of the second hypothesis requires checking the reciprocity of trust relations between the government and the population. That is, if we trust the institutions of authority, then do we permit the deceit in relations to these institutions on our behalf (“Is it possible to deceit the representatives of…”).

The level of protests’ expectation in the Tyumen region is quite high: more than a half of the region's residents believe that there is a big possibility of population’s mass protests in their living area. And protection of the human rights is more likely according to the people’s opinion. Half (50%) of the respondents believe that there is the potential of mass protests against the decrease of living standards (“Definitely possible”; “Possible under certain conditions”). And less amount of Tyumen region citizens tend to believe the possibility of mass protests with political demands. But it is impossible to consider this rate low (Figure 3-4). The level of mass protests expectation is, to some extent, an indirect assessment of the economic, social and political situation in the region and society. And that is also a personal feeling of tension in the social space, a sense of “normality” of living conditions, justice/injustice of income distribution and law implementation, having confidence or lacking it in the possibility to defend their rights, the assessment of institutions of authority ability to perform their functions for the benefit of society.

Being asked about their own readiness to take part in mass protests, individuals state then another motives for their answers, connected, as a rule, with their private lives. That is why the declared personal readiness to participate in the protests is always lower.

We have shown the direct correlation, i.e. the growth of institutional trust is accompanied by the adequate growth of protest potential (Figure 5). Moreover, in more prosperous regions (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District) articulate protest potential is significantly higher than in small towns, villages, poor and subsidized regions. The data could be interpreted as the demonstration of the discrepancies between articulated assessments and reality. However, the latter fact has no signs or evidence. Moreover, there is “ultra-high” trust in the President of Russia (73% in 2015), and rather high one in the government (50%), that is not supported by norms of reciprocity and control.
The data shown in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 5, Table 2 were tested using the SPSS program. Microdata for the relevant periods was taken as the average for the sample, macro data – the average for the region. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated. As the number of averages for the region (macro) contains only 5 points, the result of the confidence level was very low. We have taken only the coefficients for which p <0/1 Among the average (of 14) there is only a stable relationship between the two types of data: A and B in parentheses Pearson correlation coefficient:

A. Protection index– average: Institutional Trust – average (0.894 *).

B. Real money incomes of the population: Index of physical volume of investment in fixed assets (0.918 *). You and your family have a better life than the previous year, or worse? ("Began to live much better" + "began to live a little better", % on average): Real money incomes of the population (0.880 *). You and your family have a better life than the previous year, or worse? ("Began to live much better" + "began to live a little better", & on average): Index of physical volume of investment in fixed assets (0.949*).

C. How satisfied are you with your life in general? ("Completely satisfied" + "rather satisfied", % on average) – Do I now believe or are not sure about their future? (0.948).

Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed. Institutional trust is associated with self-assessment of security (link A). Statistical indicators of economic dynamics are fully confirmed this self-assessments of the dynamics at the micro level (connection B). Satisfaction with life as a whole is supported by a strategic optimism (link C). We tried to test the second hypothesis at the level of macro-regions of Russia. Due to the nature of sociological and statistical data, we take the data in the context of federal districts, an opinion poll for 2015 (spring), the statistics for 2015 according to Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/, (10.10.2016).
Our second hypothesis is also supported by empirical data for Russia as a whole and for specific Tyumen region. The expectation of protest activity among young people (aged 18 to 35) is rising sharply in the only big city in the Tyumen region – in Tyumen. Other cities, towns, villages and social strata demonstrate less interest in protests. At the same time, the self-estimation of their social status is closely connected with satisfaction with their life in general and, therefore with social well-being, which, in its turn, has the direct impact on generalized trust rates. The level of social well-being (0 – minimum value, 1 – maximum value, calculated as the average of the protection assessments, strategic and tactical optimism, satisfaction with life in general) correlates directly with institutional trust (Table 2). The dynamics of these indices is demonstrated in Figure 6. Positive dynamics of social well-being is related to strategic optimism and assessment of life in general, and at the same time the evaluation of the nearest past and the nearest future in general is negative.

We have tried to reveal how rational trust is. Our hypothesis is that the growth of trust must be accompanied by the growth of social well-being, assessment of social optimism and the approval of the authorities’ actions. At the same time, we will try to assess the level of reciprocity in the assessment (“May we deceit the representatives of…?”).
Table 2. The Spearman correlation coefficient between the trust level and social well-being components, readiness to deceit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interpersonal trust</th>
<th>Satisfaction with life in general (1)</th>
<th>Protection index (2)</th>
<th>Strategic optimism (3)</th>
<th>Tactic optimism (4)</th>
<th>Live better this year (5)</th>
<th>Institutional Trust (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with life in</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>general (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection factor (2)</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic optimism (3)</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactic optimism (4)</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live better this year (5)</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Trust</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table shows only the values, the error level of which is less than 0.001, and the absolute correlation value is above 0.1, the confidence probability is 95% social wellbeing index is the arithmetic average of its three components \(((1) + (2) + (Social\_optimism))/3\). For its part, the social optimism index \((Social\_optimism) = ((3) + (4) + (5))/3\).

(1) The degree of satisfaction with life in general is the sum of the answers to the question “How satisfied are you with your life in general?”: “Completely satisfied” + “Rather satisfied”.

(2) Protection index (average). The level of the population protection from the problems and dangers is evaluated in accordance to the answers to the question: “Do you personally feel protected from the various dangers nowadays?”, that contains the list of 10 dangerous problems (the sum of answers “Rather protected” and “Fully protected”). The list of problems and dangers includes (ranked according to the level of insecurity): crime, poverty, environmental threat, arbitrariness of officials, arbitrariness of law enforcement authorities, loneliness and abandonment, persecution on political beliefs, age or sex oppression, oppression of religious beliefs, infringement of nationality. The index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the average positive responses to 10 components.

(3-5) \((Social\_optimism) = ((3) + (4) + (5))/3\). Social optimism is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the average of the scores for each component: “Are you confident in your future?” (3) – confidence in the future (strategic optimism); positive answers to the question “Do you think you and your family will live better the next year than today?”, tactical optimism, (4); positive answers to the question “Do you and your family live better this year than the previous” (5).

(6) The institutional trust (index) was calculated as the mean arithmetic from the sum of options “Trust completely” and “Probably trust” to the question “Tell us, please, to what extent do you trust or do not trust the representatives of regional control systems?” (Figure 2).

Positive answers to the question “Can employers deceit their employees?” do not correlate with the level of vertical trust, thus the question is not specified in the table.

Methodology of calculation of social well-being’s integrated index and its three components is demonstrated, for instance in (Regions in Russia … 2009, pp. 57-63).

Source: compiled from the copyright surveys.

The correlations’ analysis (Table 2) demonstrates that the level of trust is directly related to all components of social well-being. However, the trust in the court, the government, the police and in municipal authorities is closely connected with the rate of social protection, while the optimism components are less connected with the level of trust. The weak connection of approval (disapproval) of deceit and trust draws much attention. Moreover, if
the rates of correlation with the assessment of possible deceit on the part of the respondents in relation to the authorities are statistically stable (at the error level less than 0.001), but weak in intensity, then the assessment of possible deceit in regard to the respondents themselves from the representatives of authority do not correlate with the trust level.

That is, assessment of trust in authority is not reciprocate, trust is not determined by rational considerations of an individual. Authority is viewed as something sacred, and authority control is not taken as a necessary form of public consciousness.

Figure 7. The relationship between the indexes of economic dynamics and the average of institutional trust, Tyumen region

![Graph showing the relationship between economic dynamics and institutional trust]

Source: compiled from the copyright surveys.

If we follow S. Knack and try to check the correlation between the level of trust and gross regional product (GRP) in Russian regions, the result will be contradictory (Knack, Keefer 1997). Our hypothesis is that Russian regions are going through the period of asymmetrical modernization. The citizens of the regions that modernize in accordance with European modernization vector, reduce the trust in the sacredness of authorities, and the relationship between trust and economic development restores. However, in most Russian regions the dynamics of the relationship to the authorities take the direction of increasing faith in the “strong hand”, “care about people”. In these regions, strategic optimism, trust, and satisfaction with life in general according to their own self-estimation are not directly connected with the assessments of financial situation, the dynamics of population’s real incomes and economic indicators. In intraregional perspectives (in Tyumen region, for example) the average of institutional trust and the dynamics of industrial production, of physical volume of
investments in fixed capital and of real monetary income vary in antiphase (Figure 7).

**Table 3. The relationship between the trust index (the average, on scale from 0 to 100, 2015) and Russia’s economic indicators in Federal districts, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal District</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>GRP (gross regional product) per capita</th>
<th>Investments in fixed capital, billion rubles</th>
<th>Monetary income per capita per month, rubles</th>
<th>Industrial production, billion rubles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central FD</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>369.28</td>
<td>3435.97</td>
<td>19008.3</td>
<td>19077.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest FD</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>403.55</td>
<td>1357.86</td>
<td>28571.7</td>
<td>5671.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privolzhsky FD</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>288.44</td>
<td>2355.97</td>
<td>24019.7</td>
<td>8638.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South FD</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>251.95</td>
<td>1277.24</td>
<td>24327.5</td>
<td>7738.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus FD</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>140.73</td>
<td>516.92</td>
<td>20691.6</td>
<td>1416.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural FD</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>623.06</td>
<td>2322.60</td>
<td>30493.9</td>
<td>7738.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberian FD</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>286.63</td>
<td>1440.98</td>
<td>21490.4</td>
<td>5600.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East FD</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>452.16</td>
<td>820.14</td>
<td>31974.1</td>
<td>2902.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlations</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We have tried to test this hypothesis (Table 3). In regard to the nature of sociological and statistical data, we consider the data in the context of Federal districts, a sociological survey of 2015 (spring) and statistic data of 2015 according to Federal State Statistics Service, [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/](http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/) (10.10.2016).

This hypothesis is partially confirmed. As a target variable, we’ll consider the level of trust in regional institutions. It is not influenced by the volume of investments in fixed capital in Federal districts, and GRP per capita, industrial production and its index have just little effect on it, and, moreover, the industrial production is connected with the opposite sign. The influence of per capita monetary income per month is slightly higher (0.56 with a trust interval of 0.9). However, these data should not be considered as absolute. First of all, in Russia there is a strong regional differentiation of the living wage and prices. Secondly, GDP per capita depends significantly on the density of population and registration of such strategic Russian companies as Gazprom, Rosneft, etc. Thirdly, it is still a question, what affects and what is the target option, most likely there is mutual influence of these factors.

F. Fukuyama’s hypothesis is not confirmed by the statistics of Russia and its regions. The relationship between GRP per capita and the level of institutional trust is low. Mutual influence of differentiation of per capita income and the level of trust is much stronger in terms of macro-regions (Federal districts). Most likely, there is the effect of the transitional
type of society. We agree that there are fundamental differences between the so-called traditional (or, in other terms, archaic) societies and modern ones (or capitalist), especially when we speak about the basis of “trust – distrust” to the institutions of authority. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the today Russian society is modernized, in the number of publications we have already pointed out the fact that the society is “frozen in its transfer to modern” (Yamagishi, Cook, Watabe 1998). Indirectly this conclusion is confirmed by the detected significantly stronger connection between the support of the values of traditionalism and the level of institutional trust. For example, the support of the statement “In life, the main attention should be given to establish good relations within the family and friends” (collectivism) is correlated with the trust in the President of Russia at the level of 0.249**, with the trust in the Church - of 0.152**, and the trust in the mass media – of 0,112**. “The main thing is the respect for established customs and traditions” correlates with the trust in the President of Russia at the level 0.202**, trust in the Church – of 0,154**, and there is no correlation with the trust in the mass media. Whereas the support of the statement “The main thing in life is taking care of your health and well-being” (individualism) is correlated with the trust in the President of Russia at the level of 0,144**, trust in the Church – of 0,068**, trust in the mass media – of 0,14** (**mark the maximum significant correlation). Supporting the statement “The main thing is initiative, enterprise, and searching the new in work and life, even if you find yourself in the minority” is almost not correlated with the level of trust.

The insights

For a very long period of empirical surveys from 2006 till 2016 the average of “vertical trust” level in Tyumen region, as well as in Russia in general, has increased. The trust and the protest potential are growing in a unidirectional way.

The concept of “vertical trust” statistically stably connected with the assessment of the social security of an individual, as well as with social well-being, and self-assessment of their social status, but the power of this connection is not great. The power of the connection between the various components of “vertical trust” and optimism level decreases during the transition from the strategic, unconditional rates towards the tactical ones, the ones of changes and expectations of such changes next year.

Content-semantic “filling” of trust concept is not always clearly expressed on the rational basis, and the dynamics of Russia’s development after 2006 depicts decline of rational
grounds, and the growth of “sacredness” of the authority in the population’s mind.

Perhaps that is the reason why the decrease in living standards that has affected all segments of the population has not yet affected the level of vertical trust. However, it is not an endless process. Currently, Russian regions’ citizens assess their lives now and in the future rather in a positive way, and rely on the authorities promises. But in the case of more dramatic drops in living standards, there would be the possibility of a quick and sharp collapse in almost all areas of social space.

The relationship of the concept of “vertical trust” (“distrust”) and the “possibility of deceit” between an individual and the authorities is not obvious or is statistically weak, that confirms the hypothesis of non-transparency of vertical trust relations. The latter is indirectly confirmed by the lack of connection between institutional trust and social and demographic parameters.

Vertical trust decreases with the increase of the level and quality of life in all respects. Perhaps that is the reflection of simultaneous transfer of social layers in opposite directions. Big cities’ residents, wealthy citizens of more prosperous and developed regions prefer to rely on their own strength, and their social consciousness quite successfully modernizes. Citizens of weak, subsidized regions, villages, low-income citizens prefer to rely on sacred authority, their vertical trust rises and interpersonal trust falls. Special features of economic dynamics in Russia after 2009 are following: the decrease of living standards concerned primarily the average and above average deciles of the socio-economic pyramid at the micro level. At the mesolevel, the dispersion of regional socio-economic development decreases. That is, the crisis has affected mostly developed regions, the most modernized clusters of the economy, and the most modernized sectors of the economy. These processes reflect in the mass disappointment in concepts and discourse of modernization, in liberal values and democracy itself, and in the policy of “strong hand” support at both – the mesolevel and at micro one.

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References


